Bankruptcy - Dealing with an Unhealthy Debtor: At What Point Does a Check Have Value in Bankruptcy by Noah, Paul J.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 69 Number 1 Article 11 
1993 
Bankruptcy - Dealing with an Unhealthy Debtor: At What Point 
Does a Check Have Value in Bankruptcy 
Paul J. Noah 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Noah, Paul J. (1993) "Bankruptcy - Dealing with an Unhealthy Debtor: At What Point Does a Check Have 
Value in Bankruptcy," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 69 : No. 1 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol69/iss1/11 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. 
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
BANKRUPTCY-DEALING WITH AN UNHEALTHY
DEBTOR: AT WHAT POINT DOES A CHECK HAVE
VALUE IN BANKRUPTCY?
Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992)
I. FACTS
On November 18, 1985, the debtor' delivered a check in pay-
ment of a bona fide debt to William Barnhill.2 The check was
honored by the debtor's bank on November 20, the ninetieth day
prior to the debtor's voluntary filing of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition.3 Johnson, the trustee of the debtor's estate, filed an
adversary action against Barnhill claiming that the payment was
recoverable as a preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) because the
transfer was made during the ninety-day preference period.4 The
trustee asserted that the transfer occurred on the date that the
1. The debtor in this case was actually a collection of debtors whose related bankruptcy
filings had been consolidated into a single proceeding. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386,
1388 n.1 (1992). The debtors included: Alan J. and Mary Frances Antweil, husband and
wife; Morris Antweil (deceased); and Hobbs Pipe & Supply, a general partnership. Id. The
consolidation is insignificant to the Supreme Court holding, so reference is made in this
discussion to them collectively as "debtor."
2. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1388 (1992). The debtor had postdated the
check to November 19, 1985. Id. After filing suit to recover the alleged preferential
transfer, the trustee attempted to amend the complaint, claiming that the "date of
delivery" rule does not apply to postdated checks. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 111
B.R. 337, 338-39 (D.N.M. 1990). The bankruptcy court denied the motion, asserting that
even as amended, the complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss, because November
19, 1985 was still outside the ninety-day preference period. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re
Antweil), 97 B.R. 69, 70 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1989). Further, the court opined that the "date of
delivery" rule applied to postdated checks. Id. It noted that the "date of delivery" rule had
been adopted earlier by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re White River, 799 F.2d
631, 633 (10th Cir. 1986). Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 97 B.R. 69, 70 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1989), aff'd, 111 B.R. 337 (D.N.M. 1990), rev'd, 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 112 S. Ct.
1386 (1992). The bankruptcy court and the Tenth Circuit accepted as fact, however, that
the delivery occurred on November 18, 1985. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 931 F.2d
689, 691 (10th Cir. 1992). The bankruptcy court followed the decision in In re White River,
in which the Tenth Circuit determined that for purposes of § 547(c), the "date of delivery"
rule should apply to postdated checks. Antweil, 97 B.R. at 70 (citing In re White River, 799
F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1986)). The Tenth Circuit, however, distinguished its earlier holding in
White River and held that, for purposes of § 547(b), the "date of honor" rule should apply.
Antweil, 931 F.2d 689. The Supreme Court did not address the issue of at what point a
postdated check is "delivered" for purposes of § 547(c).
3. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1388.
4. Antweil, 111 B.R. at 338-39. Section 547 is the preference provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, and subsection (b) is the provision which authorizes a trustee to avoid
certain pre-bankruptcy transactions that have the effect of frustrating the distribution
scheme set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-79
(1977).
Section 547(b) sets forth the elements of a preference:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
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bank honored the check.5 Barnhill, however, claimed that the
transfer occurred on the date that he received the check.' The
bankruptcy court agreed with Barnhill and held that the transfer
occurred on the date the check was delivered, rather than when it
was honored by the drawee bank.7 Therefore, because the date
the check was delivered was outside the ninety-day preference
period, the bankruptcy court refused to void the transfer as a pref-
erence, thereby denying recovery to the trustee." The district
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the
filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was
an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). As § 547(bX4XB) indicates, supra, the ninety-day preference
period is extended to one year for a creditor who is an "insider." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
Therefore, a trustee may void preferential transfers by insiders up to one year prior to the
bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1988) (defining "insider").
5. Antweil, 97 B.R. at 70. If a transfer is voided as a preference, the result is that the
property transferred is recoverable for the benefit of the estate, and available for an
eventual distribution to the creditors. "Transfer" is defined as:
every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary,
of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of
redemption ....
11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
Section 547(e) provides further guidance on the meaning and dating of a transfer:
(eXI) For the purposes of this section-
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is per-
fected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien
that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) For purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a
transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the
transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after
such 10 days ....
11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1988).
6. Antweil, 97 B.R. at 70.
7. Id. The bankruptcy court indicated that the "date of delivery" rule had been
adopted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals earlier in In re White River Corp., 799 F.2d
631 (10th Cir. 1986). Id. It noted that one purpose stated by the White River court in
adopting the "date of delivery" rule was to allow the debtor, rather than the bank, to
determine the "precise date of transfer." Id.
8. Id.
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court affirmed. 9
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding
that a "date of honor" rule should govern § 547(b) actions.' 0 The
issue on appeal to the United States Supreme Court was whether,
for the purposes of determining if a transfer occurred within the
ninety-day preference period of § 547, a transfer made by check
should be deemed to occur (1) on the date the check is presented
to the recipient, or (2) on the date the drawee bank honors the
check." The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tenth
Circuit, holding that for purposes of § 547(b), a transfer made by
check is deemed to occur on the date the check is honored by the
drawee bank.' 2
II. LEGAL HISTORY
Until 1978, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the developing
case law provided the foundation for bankruptcy law in this coun-
try. 13 The Act contained a preference provision which allowed a
trustee to void any preferential transfers of a debtor that occurred
within four months preceeding the bankruptcy filing. 4 In 1978,
Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and reformed cer-
tain sections of the Bankruptcy Code, including the preference
provision.' 5 Congress modernized the substantive law of bank-
ruptcy,' 6 and changed the period for preferential payment recov-
9. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 111 B.R. 337 (D.N.M. 1990). The court asserted
that most federal courts which have considered a "§ 547 transfer by check" issue have
applied a "date of delivery" rule. Id. at 339. It also noted that the Ninth Circuit was the
only circuit to have decided when a § 547(b) transfer occurred, and the Ninth Circuit had
held that a "date of delivery" rule applied. Id. at 340. The court determined that the "date
of delivery" rule was also in accord with the policy objectives and the legislative history of
§ 547(c). Id.
10. Barnhill v. Johnson (In re Antweil), 931 F.2d 689, 695 (1991). For an explanation of
why the Tenth Circuit held that a "date of honor" rule should apply, see the text
accompanying notes 52-63, infra.
11. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386 (1992).
12. Id. at 1392.
13. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5965. For a discussion of the probable result in the instant case under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see the text accompanying notes 47-51, infra.
14. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978).
15. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
16. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 5965. To avoid confusion, Congress modernized bankruptcy law. Id. The last
significant change prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act occurred in 1938. Id. Since
that time, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has been adopted, changes have taken
place in laws dealing with debtor-creditor relations, and there has been an increased
reliance on consumer credit. Id. Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code again in 1984,
but these amendments did not alter the ninety-day preference period of § 547(b), and
therefore need not be included in this discussion.
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ery from four months to ninety days. 17 The legislative history
clarifies that one purpose of these reforms was to make bankruptcy
law more congruent with modem commercial practices and, more
particularly, to achieve conformity with the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC).' 8
The UCC article governing commercial paper provides in rel-
evant part: "A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an
assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its
payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he
accepts it."' 9 Under this provision, no transfer of funds takes place
until a check is honored. 20 Courts have used the language con-
tained in the UCC to assert that until a check is actually accepted
and paid by the drawee bank, the transfer can be prevented by
others through such means as garnishment of the bank account.2 1
This UCC analysis which concludes that a transfer by check is
not complete until it is paid by the drawee bank, raises confusion
when reviewed against the legislative history of subsections
547(cXl) and (2) of the Bankruptcy Code.22 The confusion arises
because while the legislative committees indicated that for the
purposes of subsections 547(cXl) and (2), payment is made when
the check is delivered, the UCC analysis has been used to conclude
that payment by check is not complete until paid by the drawee
17. Id.
18. H.R. REP..No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6328. The legislative history provides: "This section [547] is a substantial modification of
the present law. It modernizes the preference provisions and brings them more into
conformity with commercial practice and the Uniform Commercial Code." Id.
19. UCC § 3-409(1), 2A U.L.A. 189 (1991).
20. Id. See, e.g., Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that
under the UCC, checks are merely requests to drawee banks to pay funds to payees, not an
assignment of funds).
21. See, e.g., Nicholson v. First Inv. Co., 705 F.2d 410, 413 (11th Cir. 1983) (using the
"date of honor" rule in voiding a corporate check that depleted bankrupt's estate). See also
Kenneth D. Ferguson, Does Payment by Check Constitute a Transfer Upon Delivery or
Payment?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93 (Jan. 1990) (examining the split among the circuits and
arguing in favor of using the "date of honor" rule).
22. The legislative statements made by Senator DeConcini and Representative
Edwards, who were involved in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, include the following
statement:
Contrary to the language contained in the house report, payment of a debt by
means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the check is dishonored.
Payment is considered to be made when the check is delivered for purposes of
section 547(cXl) and (2).
Bernstein v. RJL Leasing (In re White River Corp.), 799 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1986)
(citing 124 CONG. REC. H 11097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)). Senator DeConcini was Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Improvements of Judicial Machinery for the United States
Senate. 124 CONG. REC. S 17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). Representative Edwards was
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights for the United States
House of Representatives. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1978) reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5963-65. These subcommittees supervised the drafting of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Id.
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bank.23 Subsections 547(cX1) and (2) are two exceptions to what a
trustee may void as a preferential transfer under the provisions of
§ 547(b).2 4 Statements made in the legislative history of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 indicate that for these subsections, a
payment is considered to be made when the check is delivered.2 5
Because the legislative history is silent with respect to payments
made for § 547(b) purposes, it is unclear how these statements
relate to the preference provisions contained therein.2 6 Different
interpretations of legislative intent have led courts to vary in their
determinations of when a transfer occurs.2 7
While the most important purpose of § 547(b) is to facilitate
equal distribution of the debtor's nonexempt assets among the
creditors,28 the purpose of the § 547(c) defenses is to encourage
23. See supra notes 20, 22 and accompanying text.
24. Section 547(c) provides:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value
given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course
of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms....
11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1988).
25. See supra note 22.
26. For a general discussion of the inconsistent approach used by different courts, see
Reid, infra note 48, at 715.
27. See White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 633. The White River court indicated that a
transfer occurs on the date a check is delivered for purposes of § 547(cX2). Id. This holding
was based in part on the "ordinary course of business" exception to the preference
provision. Id. at 632 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 547(cX2) (1988)). The court added: "In the
commercial world receipt of a check, as distinguished from the date it clears the drawee
bank, is customarily looked upon as the date of payment of an obligation." Id. at 634
(quoting Young Supply Co. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 55 B.R. 356, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1985)). See
Global Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F.2d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a transfer occurs on receipt of the check, provided the check is honored
within the ten-day outer limit imposed by § 547(e)). Compare id. with New York City
Shoes, Inc. v. Bentley Int'l, Inc. (In re New York City Shoes, Inc.), 880 F.2d 679, 685 (3d Cir.
1989). The Bentley court held that postdated checks were presumed transferred for
§ 547(cX4) purposes either on the date indicated on the check or on the date that the check
clears the bank, rather than the date on which the check was delivered. New York City
Shoes, Inc. v. Bentley Int'l, Inc., 880 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1989). The court noted that because
the purposes of subsections 547(b) and (c) are completely different, the definition of
"transfer" need not be the same for both subsections. Id. at 681 n.2. The court reached this
conclusion by reviewing the purposes of § 547(cX4). Id.
28. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 931 F.2d 689, 692 (10th Cir. 1991). See REPORT
OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 202 (1976). The Bankruptcy Code has three goals when governing
preferences. Id. First, it attempts to lessen the chances of "scramble among the creditors"
for preferential treatment by the debtor on the eve of bankruptcy. Id. Second, it seeks to
distribute property of the debtor's estate on a pro rata basis among the creditors. Id. Third,
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trade creditors and other suppliers of goods and services to con-
tinue dealing with troubled businesses without fear of the trustee's
avoidance powers.29  The articulated purpose of the § 547
defenses led one court to note the importance of assessing the cir-
cumstances of the transaction and protecting the expectations of
each party depending upon those circumstances. 30
There is a considerable division among the circuits with
respect to when a transfer takes place for § 547(b) purposes.3 In
Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc.,32 the Ninth Circuit was the
first to review the legislative history of § 547(c). 33 The debtor in
Richcraft delivered the checks to the creditor three days prior to
the beginning of the preference period, and the drawee bank
honored the checks on the first and second days of the preference
period.34 Shamrock successfully argued that payment was made
on the date the checks were delivered, and therefore the transfer
occurred outside the time frame in which the transaction could be
successfully attacked as a preference. 35 The court studied the leg-
islative history of the § 547(c) exceptions, and used it in determin-
ing that a transfer by check occurs on the delivery date, as long as
the creditor presents the check for payment within a reasonable
time and the bank does not dishonor it.36
The Sixth Circuit arrived at the same conclusion in Official
Unsecured Creditors Committee of Belknap, Inc. v. Shaler Corp.
(In re Belknap, Inc.).3 7  In Belknap, the creditor received the
debtor's check prior to the beginning of the ninety-day preference
period, but the drawee bank did not honor the check until after
the preference period had begun.38 The Belknap court observed
it eliminates a creditor's desire to make unwise loans to obtain a preferential payment or
security. Id. Section 547(b) allows the trustee in bankruptcy to void as a preference a
transfer previously made by a debtor to a noninsider creditor on or within ninety days of
the bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
29. White River Corp., 799 F.2d at 634.
30. Antweil, 931 F.2d at 693. As the Tenth Circuit articulated, "Section 547(cXl)
prohibits the trustee from avoiding a transfer 'intended by the debtor and the creditor...
to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor,' and which is, in fact,
substantially contemporaneous. The purchase of goods or services for cash falls within this
exception." Id. The court further stated that "[iln this context, it is important to consider
that most people view the giving of a check as a cash transaction." Id.
31. For a discussion of the circuit split, see Ferguson, supra note 21.
32. 680 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982).
33. Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc., 680 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1982).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 909 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1990).
38. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Belknap, Inc. v. Shaler Corp., (In re
Belknap), 909 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1990). Three checks were mailed to the creditor: The
first, which the debtor had mailed and was received by the creditor prior to the preference
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that although the legislative history of § 547 indicates that a trans-
fer occurs upon delivery with regard to only subsections (cX 1) and
(cX2), it nonetheless held that a "date of delivery" rule should be
used for subsection 547(b) as well. 39 The court viewed the exclu-
sion of subsection 547(b) from legislative history as "symptomatic
of 'troublesome' Committee Reports" rather than as indicative of
Congress' intent to create two definitions of "transfer. ' 40  The
court determined that "transfer" was intended to have a uniform
meaning, and that to give the word two meanings within one sec-
tion would be "inconsistent, unworkable and confusing."'4 1 There-
fore, the Belknap court applied the "date of delivery" rule
outlined in the legislative history of § 547(c) to determine the tim-
ing of a § 547(b) transfer.
In Counts v. Wang Laboratories, Inc. (In re Virginia Informa-
tion Systems Corp. ),42 the Fourth Circuit came to the same conclu-
sion using a different analysis. Rather than applying the legislative
history of § 547(c) directly to § 547(b), the court concluded that the
reasoning behind adopting a "date of delivery" rule for the
§ 547(c) exceptions applies with equal force to § 547(b) transfers.43
The court asserted that in specifying that a "date of delivery" rule
should be used for § 547(c), Congress sought consistency between
commercial reality and trade creditors' expectations.44 The court
indicated that adopting the "date of delivery" rule for both subsec-
tions better served the overall purpose of encouraging creditors to
continue doing business with struggling debtors.45 The rule also
served bankruptcy law by "recognizing that in the commercial
arena, for most purposes, payment by check is the end of a com-
mercial transaction. "46
period, but was honored within the preference period; the second, which the debtor had
mailed prior to the start of the preference period, but the creditor had received and the
bank honored within the preference period; and the third, which was mailed within the
preference period. Id. The court held that the date of receipt constituted the date of
delivery. Id. Therefore, only the first check was found to be outside of the preference
period. Id.
39. Id. at 883.
40. Id. (quoting Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in
Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 761 (1985)). See supra note 5 (defining "transfer"). For
a review of the legislative history, see supra note 22.
41. Belknap, 909 F.2d at 883.
42. 932 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1991).
43. Counts v. Wang Laboratories, Inc. (In re Virginia Info. Sys. Corp.), 932 F.2d 338,
341, 342 (4th Cir. 1991).
44. See id. at 342.
45. Virginia Info. Sys. Corp., 932 F.2d at 342.
46. Id. The "date of delivery" rule was also adopted for § 547(b) purposes by the
Seventh Circuit in Global Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion Co., 949 F.2d 910
(7th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit determined that under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, a
transfer occurs on receipt of the check, provided that the check is honored within ten days.
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Conversely, in 1983, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the "date
of honor" rule in Nicholson v. First Investment Co. 47 Rather than
relying on legislative history, the court utilized the language of 11
U.S.C. § 96(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which had been
repealed in 1978, to determine the case under a security interest
rationale. 8 Section 96(aX2) provided that a transfer was deemed
to have been made when it became "so far perfected" that no sub-
sequent lien could become superior to the rights of the trans-
feree.4 9 The court determined that a transfer did not occur at the
time the debtor delivered the check because a creditor could still
prevent collection of the funds by garnishing the bank account.5 °
The court asserted that for a § 547(b) transfer, the "so far per-
fected" language of § 96(aX2) required that the effective date of
transfer occurred on the "date of honor" of the check. 1
III. CASE ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit concluded in Johnson v. Barnhill (In re
Antweil), 2 that a transfer occurs when the drawee bank honors
the check.53 The court reviewed the Bankruptcy Code's prefer-
ence provision and determined that because subsections 547(b)
and (c) serve different purposes, the "definition of 'transfer' need
not be the same for both subsections. '5 4 The court asserted that
"the most important purpose of § 547(b) is to facilitate equal distri-
bution of the debtor's assets among the creditors,"55 and unlike
§ 547(c), the intent of the parties at the time of the transfer was
not material to the general question of whether that transfer
Id. The court applied the ten-day period of § 547(eX2XA) as the outer limit in reaching its
conclusion. Id. at 914. For a review of § 547(eX2XA), see supra note 5.
47. 705 F.2d 410, 413 (11th Cir. 1983).
48. Nicholson v. First Inv. Co., 705 F.2d 410, 412, 413 (1lth Cir. 1983). See generally
Lisa R. Reid, Note, "TRANSFERS BY CHECK" The 90-day Rule of Preference Recovery
Under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 1987 DUKE L.J. 712, 722-23 (indicating that
courts which deal with the issue of when a transfer is "perfected," have applied different
subsections of § 547(e) to transfers by check for § 547(b) purposes with inconsistent results).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 96(aX2) (1976) (repealed 1978). In determining when a transfer had
taken place, § 96(aX2) provided that, "a transfer of property ... shall be deemed to have
been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien
upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could
become superior to the rights of the transferee." Id. (emphasis added). Section 547(eX1XB)
replaced § 96(aX2). 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1988). For a review of this section, see supra note 5.
50. Nicholson, 705 F.2d at 413.
51. Id. There are conflicting theories on whether or not Congress intended § 547(e) to
apply to § 547(b) check transfers. For a discussion of these theories, see Reid, supra note 48,
at 722-23.
52. 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991).
53. Johnson v. Barnhill (In re Antweil), 931 F.2d 689, 691 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 692.
55. Id. For a review of the goals of the preference provision, see supra note 28.
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should be considered a preference. 56 The Tenth Circuit noted
that this purpose contrasted with § 547(c),57 which was intended
"to encourage trade creditors and other suppliers of goods and
services to continue to deal with troubled businesses without fear
of a trustee's avoidance powers."'58 To effectuate the goals of the
§ 547(c) defenses, the court stressed the importance of protecting
the "ordinary commercial expectations of the parties." 59 There-
fore, the court observed, that while the "date of delivery" rule
should govern for § 547(c) purposes because it considers the par-
ties' intent, the "date of honor" rule better serves the purpose of
§ 547(b) by facilitating equal distribution of the bankruptcy
estate.60 The court then reviewed the legislative history, and
noted that conformity with commercial practices and the UCC
was a particular goal of the revised preference provision.61 It
determined that the "date of honor" rule conformed more closely
to commercial practices and the UCC than the "date of delivery"
rule.62 Finally, the court noted that a "date of honor" rule was
capable of easier proof because only a bank statement would be
required to show the date of transfer.6 3
In Barnhill v. Johnson, the Supreme Court affirmed the deci-
sion of the Tenth Circuit, and held that for purposes of § 547(b), a
transfer by check is deemed to occur on the date the check is
honored.6 The Court reviewed § 547(b) using the definition of
transfer provided by 11 U.S.C § 101(54), and supplemented by
§ 547(eX2XA). 65 The Court noted that it had previously articu-
56. Antweil, 931 F.2d at 692-93 (citing 4 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, § 547.01 at 547-12 (15th ed. 1991)). The court further explained that
preferential payments occur when creditors do not structure the transactions to protect
themselves against possible bankruptcy before extending credit. Id. at 693. Payment on
these debts usually is not made while being aware of a bankruptcy filing which might take
place ninety days in the future. Id. Thus, the court noted, "the intent of the parties as to
when the transfer is deemed completed is irrelevant." Id.
57. Antweil, 931 F.2d at 692. To review the relevant exceptions under § 547(c), see
supra note 24.
58. Antweil, 931 F.2d at 693.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 692. The court never explicitly stated why a "date of honor" rule better
facilitates the purposes of § 547(b).
61. Antweil, 931 F.2d at 693.
62. Id. at 694.
63. Id.
64. 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1391 (1992).
65. Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (1992). For the definition of "transfer,"
see supra note 5. After the Tenth Circuit reviewed the pertinent sections of the
Bankruptcy Code, it examined the legislative history and the underlying purposes of the
sections. Antweil, 931 F.2d at 693. The court applied the purposes set forth in the
legislative history in reaching its conclusion. Id. The Supreme Court, in addition to noting
the respective purposes of each section, conducted an analysis using definitions in the
Bankruptcy Code and the UCC to reach its conclusion. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1389-91. In
dismissing the creditor's argument relying on legislative history, the Court indicated "that
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lated66 that "[w]hat constitutes a transfer and when it is complete"
is a matter of federal law.67 It added that it is a matter of federal
law because the definition of "transfer" arises under a federal stat-
ute intended to have uniform application throughout the United
States.6' However, the Court realized that the definition of "trans-
fer" included references to "parting with property and interests in
property," and that in the absence of any controlling federal law,
"property" and "interests in property" are creatures of state law.69
Therefore, because of the reliance on state law, the Court con-
cluded it was important to consider the rights and duties that each
party had to a transaction involving a check under state law.7 °
The Court then examined the statutes of the state in which
the transaction occurred, and discovered that it had adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code. 1 Under the UCC, a check is merely a
signed order to the drawee bank to pay the sum stated on
demand. 2 The Court asserted that mere receipt of a check did
not give the recipient a right against the bank. 3 The recipient of
a dishonored check which was received in payment of an underly-
ing obligation may, however, maintain an action against the
drawer of the check on either the check or the underlying
obligation. 4
The Court provided this background of the state's version of
the UCC in clarifying that there could be no assertion that an
unconditional transfer of the debtor's property occurred before
November 20, the date on which the check was honored.7 1 It
appeals to legislative history are well-taken only to resolve 'statutory ambiguity,'" and the
Court perceived no ambiguity here. Id. at 1391.
66. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1389 (citing McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365
(1945)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 370 (1945)). The Court then
reviewed Butner v. United States, in which it had noted that "'Congress has generally left
the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate to state law.' " Id.
(quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
70. Id.
71. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-101 (Michie 1978 and Supp. 1992). The Court did not
observe any material difference between the version adopted by New Mexico and those
adopted by the other states. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1389 n.5.
72. UCC § 3-104(1), (2Xb), 2 U.L.A. 224 (1991).
73. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1389 (citing UCC § 3-409(1), 2A U.L.A. 189 (1991)). "A
check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of
the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until
he accepts it." Id. at 1389 n.6.
74. Id. at 1390 (citing UCC § 3-802(lXb), 2A U.L.A. 514 (1991)). The Court
acknowledged that should the drawee bank refuse to honor a check, a cause of action
against the drawer of the check accrues to the recipient of a check "upon demand following
dishonor of the instrument." Id. UCC § 3-122(3), 2 U.L.A. 407 (1991)).
75. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1390.
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asserted that a transfer had not occurred because receipt of a
check gives the recipient no right to the funds held by the bank on
the drawer's account.76  The Court indicated that the drawer
could close the account, or a third party could obtain a lien against
the account by garnishment, or the bank might mistakenly refuse
to honor the check. 7 It proceeded to explain that no transfer of
any part of the debtor's claim against the bank occurred until the
drawee bank honored the check on November 20,78 and it was not
until that time that the bank had a right to "charge" the account.79
Therefore, the Court stated that "when the debtor has directed
the drawee bank to honor the check and the bank has done so, the
debtor has implemented a 'mode, direct or indirect ... of dispos-
ing of property or an interest in property.' "80
The Court dismissed the analyses forwarded by Justice Ste-
vens' dissent, as well as by the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,
in which each indicated that the definition of "transfer" in
§ 101(54) encompassed "conditional" transfers, and that delivery
of a check should be included as a "conditional transfer. 8 1 The
Court did not interpret what the creditor received as a conditional
right to property or an interest in property, but rather that the
creditor received no interest in the debtor's property when it
76. Id. This portion of the analysis parallels the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in
Nicholson, which was decided under a security interest rationale. Nicholson v. First Inv.
Co., 705 F.2d 410, 413 (1lth Cir. 1983).
The Nicholson court relied upon 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which
was repealed in 1978. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1976) (repealed 1978). The Eleventh
Circuit had determined that a transfer does not occur at the time the debtor delivers the
check, because a creditor could still prevent collection of the funds by garnishing the bank
account. Nicholson, 705 F.2d at 413. The Supreme Court utilized essentially the same
logic as the Eleventh Circuit but rather than using the now repealed § 96(aX2), the Court
applied provisions of the UCC to reach its conclusion. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1390.
77. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1390.
78. Id. (citing UCC § 1-201(21) (defining that "[t]o 'honor' is to pay or to accept and pay
or when a credit so engages to purchase or discount a draft complying with the terms of the
credit"), 1 U.L.A. 65 (1989)).
79. Id. (citing UCC § 4-401, 2B U.L.A. 307 (1991)).
80. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)) (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 1391. The Court acknowledged that there was some credence to the
creditor's claim that the creditor did gain something when he received the check. Id. at
1390. It asserted, however, that what the creditor gained was no more than a chose in
action against the debtor. Id. The Court did not interpret what the creditor received as a
conditional right to property or an interest in property, but rather that the creditor
received no interest in the debtor's property when it received the check. Id. at 1390-91.
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits suggested that the delivery of a check was a
conditional transfer, as did Justice Stevens in his dissent. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1392
(Stevens, J., dissenting). It is unclear under the majority's reasoning what, if anything,
would qualify as a "conditional transfer" as defined in 11 U.S.C § 101(54). An argument
could be made that the majority inappropriately narrowed an expansive definition of the
term "transfer." The definition of "transfer" includes "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional... of disposing of or parting with property...." 11 U.S.C § 101(54)
(1988).
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received the check. 82 It asserted that adopting those arguments
would "accomplish a near-limitless expansion of the term 'condi-
tional.' "83 The Court concluded that for purposes of payment by
ordinary check, a "transfer," as defined by § 101(54), occurs on the
date of honor.84
The Court noted that its conclusion was consistent with
§ 547(e)(2)(A), which provides that a transfer occurs at the time the
transfer "takes effect between the transferor and the transferee
.... "8 It reasoned that because the debtor retained the ability to
stop payment on the check, the transfer did not take place until
the moment of honor.8 6 The Court then addressed the legislative
history, and began by noting that appeals to statutory history
should be considered only to resolve "statutory ambiguity. '87 It
did not perceive that "statutory ambiguity" was present,88 but
even if it did exist, the Court noted that legislative history only
applied to § 547(c), and not § 547(b).8 ' There was no legislative
history with respect to § 547(b), and unlike the circuit courts that
had adopted a "date of delivery" rule for § 547(b) purposes, the
Court found no reason to conclude that "legislative history explic-
itly confined by its own terms to § 547(c)," should apply also to
§ 547(b).90
Justice Stevens followed the consistent definitional approach
used by the Fourth,9 ' Sixth,9 2 Seventh,9 3 and Ninth Circuits, 94 and
82. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1390-91.
83. Id. at 1391.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391 (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (1991)).
88. Id.
89. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc., 680 F.2d 645, 646
(9th Cir. 1982), and the Sixth Circuit in In re Belknap, Inc., 909 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir.
1990), each concluded that the legislative history of subsections 547(cX1) and (2), should also
apply to subsection 547(b). For a discussion of these decisions, see text accompanying notes
32-41, supra.
90. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391. The Court observed that subsections 547(cXl) and (2)
are "designed to encourage creditors to continue to deal with troubled debtors on normal
business terms by obviating any worry that a subsequent bankruptcy filing might require
the creditor to disgorge as a preference an earlier received payment." Id. at 1391. The
Court concluded that these subsections were intended for a specialized purpose and need
not be applicable beyond these purposes. Id.
91. Counts v. Wang Laboratories, Inc. (In re Virginia Info. Sys. Corp.), 932 F.2d 338
(4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the rationale for adopting the "date of delivery" rule for
§ 547(c) applies with equal force to § 547(b) transfers).
92. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Belknap, Inc. v. Shaler Corp. (In re
Belknap, Inc.), 909 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that to give "transfer" two
meanings within one section would be confusing, inconsistent, and unworkable).
93. Global Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion, 949 F.2d 910, 913 (7th Cir.
1991) (noting that nothing in the structure or functions of the Bankruptcy Code supports a
different meaning of "transfer" within the same section).
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determined that this approach better served the business commu-
nity.95 In Justice Stevens' view, a "transfer" of property occurs on
the date the check is delivered, provided that the check is
honored within ten days.96 In contrast to the majority, he indi-
cated that this view was consistent with the traditional commercial
practice of treating the date of delivery as the date of payment
when payment is made by check.97 Justice Stevens also noted that
this view was in accord with the treatment of checks in tax law.98
Observing that it is wise to interpret statutes which regulate com-
mercial behavior in a manner consistent with established business
practices, he indicated that absent a congressional mandate com-
manding a contrary result, the delivery of a check should be con-
sidered payment.99 Justice Stevens asserted that "transfer," as
defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), encompassed the conditional trans-
fer of the delivery of a check to a creditor.'0 0 Further, despite the
possible intervening events between delivery and the present-
ment of a check, a check is "a conditional transfer because upon
delivery, the transferee receives a conditional right to funds in the
bank account of the maker-the condition being acceptance by
the drawee bank." 0 1
Justice Stevens then reviewed § 547(eX2) to determine when
a transfer occurs for the preference avoidance section.' 0 2 The lan-
guage of § 547(eX2) itself, combined with the definition in
§ 101(54), led him to conclude that even a conditional transfer was
a "transfer" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.10 3 According to
Stevens, "[b]ecause delivery of a check effects a conditional trans-
fer from the transferor to the transferee, the 'transfer' is made, for
purposes of § 547, on the date of delivery, provided that the trans-
94. Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc., 680 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1982) (arriving at a
similar conclusion for § 547(b) purposes after reviewing the legislative history of § 547(c)).
95. Bamhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined in the
dissent. Id. Justice Stevens observed that a "date of delivery" rule was better for business
because it was consistent with commercial practices, and therefore provided uniformity.
Id.
96. Id. at 1393 (citing § 547(eX2XA)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1392. Justice Stevens asserted that a taxpayer who delivers a check for
expenses on or before December 31, may deduct those expenses against that year's income,
even though the drawee bank does not honor the checks until the next calendar year. Id.
99. Id.
100. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1392. Justice Stevens set forth the definition of transfer
under § 101(54) and concluded that "[a] check is obviously a 'mode' through which the
debtor may 'par[t] with property.'" Id.
101. Id. at 1392 n.4. The majority offered no insight as to what it would consider a
conditional transfer.
102. Id. at 1393. To reexamine § 547(e), see supra note 5.
103. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1393.
19931 269
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
fer is 'perfected' within ten days as required by § 547(eX2).''
Additionally, he noted that the courts of appeals were unanimous
in using the "date of delivery" for § 547(c) purposes, that this
interpretation was consistent with the legislative history, and that
normally the Court assumes that the same terms have the same
meanings in different sections of the same statute.10 5 He closed by
asserting that nothing in the structure or purpose of subsections
547(b) or (c) suggests a reason for interpreting the adjacent subsec-
tions differently. 1°6
The definitional approach espoused by Justice Stevens con-
trasted with the majority opinion in a fundamental way. The
majority views the receipt of a check as merely a cause of an action
contingent upon a subsequent dishonoring of the check.' r The
Court indicates that Justice Steven's definition of transfer is too
broad and, if adopted, would "accomplish a near-limitless expan-
sion of the term 'conditional.' "108 Justice Stevens, on the other
hand, regards the receipt of a check as a conditional transfer of
property. 109 The analysis he sets forth is more persuasive for two
reasons. First, Congress provided a broad definition of the term
"transfer" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(54),11 ° and Justice Stevens applies it
correctly in his analysis."' The legislative history of the term
"transfer" indicates that:
A transfer is a disposition of an interest in property. The
definition of transfer is as broad as possible. Many of the
potentially limiting words in current law are deleted, and
the language is simplified. Under the definition, any
104. Id. Justice Stevens acknowledged that the meaning of the word "perfected" was
not immediately apparent in the context of a check, because "perfected" has a broader
meaning in § 547(e) than it does in the UCC. Id. at 1393-94.
105. Id. (citing Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990)). The majority agreed that for
purposes of § 547(c), "transfer" is defined as the "date of delivery." Id. at 1391. The Court
did not comment, however, on the dissent's assertion that "[n]ormally, we assume that the
same terms have the same meaning in different sections of the same statute." Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1393-94. Justice Stevens found the explanation set forth in Belknap
persuasive: "The policy of § 547(b) is to set aside transfers that potentially prefer selected
creditors; section 547(c), in turn, defines groups of creditors who are excepted. To give the
word 'transfer' a different meaning in these complimentary subparts seems inconsistent,
unworkable, and confusing." Id. at 1394 n.7 (citing In re Belknap, Inc., 909 F.2d 879, 883
(1990)). Although the majority discussed the respective purposes of subsections 547(b) and
(c), and why the "date of delivery" rule better accommodates § 547(c), it never indicated a
reason why a "date of honor" rule better suits the purposes of § 547(b).
107. Id. at 1390 n.8. The Court noted that it was not necessary to resolve the question
of whether the creditor held a cause of action upon the delivery of the check because the
creditor's claim would still fail in the present case. Id.
108. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391.
109. Id. at 1392.
110. To review the definition of "transfer," see supra note 5.
111. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1391.
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transfer of an interest in property is a transfer, including a
transfer of possession, custody, or control even if there is
no transfer of title, because possession, custody, and con-
tol are interests in property. A deposit in a bank account
or similar account is a transfer."12
Based on this legislative history, it can be argued that the Court
improperly narrowed an expansive definition of the term
"transfer."
Second, there is no overriding purpose served in giving the
term "transfer" two different meanings in adjacent subsections of
the Bankruptcy Code. The "date of delivery" is the transfer date
for § 547(c) purposes, but for § 547(b), a transfer does not occur
until the "date of honor." It can be argued that in order to attain
the goal of consistency and uniformity, the "date of delivery" rule
should apply to both subsections.
In conclusion, while it is apparent how the "date of delivery"
rule effectuates the goals of the § 547(c) exceptions, it is unclear
how the "date of honor" rule helps to effectuate the goals of the
§ 547(b) provisions.113 Section 547(b) is apparently no better
served by using a "date of honor" rule, than it would be by using a
"date of delivery" rule. It may be an inconsistency without reason.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Barnhill
will undoubtedly have an impact on the way debtors and creditors
deal with each other. The Uniform Commercial Code, which
served as a basis for the Court's analysis, has been adopted in all
states, including North Dakota. 114 While the Eighth Circuit indi-
cated in dicta prior to Barnhill that it adhered to a "date of honor"
rule for § 547(b) purposes," 5 the ramifications of the Supreme
112. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5813.
113. The Seventh Circuit addressed the statutory purpose of § 547 in Global
Distribution Network, Inc. v. Star Expansion, 949 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1991). It stated that
"[tihe statutory purposes would be served roughly as well by periods of 80, 90, or 100
days-and by rules defining 'transfer' as negotiation or honor of checks. Far more
important than the choice between 85 and 95 days is that the rule be simple and frustrate
me-first strategies by creditors." Global Distribution Network, 949 F.2d at 912. The court
further indicated that "considerations of text, simplicity, and legislative goals point toward
use of a delivery rule under § 547(b) as well as § 547(c)." Id. at 913.
114. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1389 n.5. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-03 (1983 and Supp.
1991). The version of the UCC adopted by North Dakota is substantially similar to the
version adopted by other states.
115. In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 930 F.2d 648, 651 (8th Cir. 1991). The case was
decided on the "new value" provision of § 547(cX4), but the court distinguished the
purposes of subsections 547(b) and (c) in reaching its conclusion. Id. The court observed
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Court decision are still noteworthy.
Manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and any other entities or
persons who extend credit, or who have in the past relied upon
checks should take notice of this decision. A check received from
a debtor is valid at the time of receipt only if it is a "contempora-
neous exchange for new value given to the debtor,"' 16 or is "in
payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business .... ",1 Therefore, creditors must insist upon a timely
repayment schedule which has been structured to ensure inclu-
sion in the "ordinary course of business" exception to the trustee's
avoidance powers. The creditor who is informed and extends
credit subject to the § 547(c) parameters is able to keep payments
by check received outside of the ninety-day preference provision
even if not cashed until after the preference period has begun.
However, to ensure protection, creditors should promptly deposit
checks received from their debtors.
The Barnhill decision also has implications for tax law. As Jus-
tice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the date of delivery of a
check is the date of payment for tax purposes, but the date of
honor is the determinative date for bankruptcy purposes." 8 The
inconsistency is highlighted by the example of the debtor having
financial difficulties who, at year's end, makes payments to reduce
his or her tax liability. The debtor is allowed to make payments to
creditors by check at year's end to take advantage of the expense
deduction on that year's tax return. The date of payment is the
date of delivery for tax purposes. However, if the debtor files for
bankruptcy ninety days after delivering the checks on December
31, the consistency sought by Congress in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 has not been achieved." 9 The "date of delivery" is
determinative for tax purposes, but the "date of honor" controls
for bankruptcy purposes.
The Barnhill holding may influence the way in which credi-
that "while the majority of courts hold that transfer occurs on payment for purposes of
determining when a preference occurs under section 547(b) ... the different policy served
by section 5 47 (cX4) justifies a different conclusion about when a transfer occurs for purposes
of section 547(cX4)." Id. (citations omitted).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 547(cXlXA) (1988). If the creditor accepts a check which is a
"contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor," the check may not be
voided as a preference by the trustee in a subsequent bankruptcy filing. Id.
117. Id. § 547(cX2XA). If the check received by the creditor is "in payment of a debt in
the ordinary course of business," the check may not be voided as a preference by the
trustee in a subsequent bankruptcy filing. Id.
118. Barnhill, 112 S. Ct. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 372, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6328.
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tors extend credit by increasing the amount of information
required of debtors, and making a structured repayment plan
essential in today's business environment. The decision arguably
causes confusion for creditors, because the § 547(c) exceptions are
governed by a "date of delivery" rule, while the § 547(b) provision
is governed by a "date of honor" rule. An argument can be made
that the goal of consistency has not been attained. At the least, the
holding puts businesses on notice that the delivery of a check is not
necessarily a transfer of money.
Paul.] Noah

